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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS S.LECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS.
. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island decides in Angell v.
Reynolds, 58 At. 625, that the defendant in an action by a
Mitigation of wife for alienation of the affections of her hus-
Damages band may, in mitigation of damages, show that
the husband had been improperly familiar with other women
during the period of defendant's illicit relations, with him,
though plaintiff was ignorant of this. See also Bailey V.
Bailey, 94 Iowa, 598.
BANKRUPTCY.
In re Dauciy, 13o Fed. 532, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) decides that where a
Discharge: bankrupt conveys-real estate by an absolute deed
Concealment more than two years prioi" to the bankruptcy, -inof Property order to constitute a fraudulent concealment by
failing to schedule the same, which will defeat the right to
a discharge, objecting creditors must show that the bankrupt'
still retains a secret interest in the property. It is not suffi-
cient that it may have been conveyed in fraud of creditors,
but it must still be in fact the property of the bankrupt's.
estate. Compare the decision in Hudson v. Mercantile Nat.
Bank, i 9 Fed. 346.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Second Cir-
cuit) decides In re C. Moench & Sons Co., 13o Fed. 685, that
Manpfac- the fact that the property of a corporation. is in
turing Cor. the possession of receivers appointed by a state
porations: court does not affect the jurisdiction of a court
Effect of
Receivership Of bankruptcy to adjudicate such corporation a
bankrupt. The appointment of receivers for a
manufacturing company and its ceasing to do business in
consequence before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
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against it do not, it is decided, deprive the court of juris-
diction to make the adjudication against it as a corporation
engaged principally in manufacturing pursuits.
The .United States District Court (N. D. Iowa, W. D.)
.h'olds In re Schcr.cr, 13o Fed. 63 1, that the deposit of money
Prefefrecc: in bank by an insolvent within four months prior
Deposit in to his bankruptcy, on open account, subject to
bank .,'check, does not constitute a transfer of property
amounting to a preference under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. although the bank may be at the time a creditor, and,
under Section 68a, the bank has a right- to apply the balance
in such account as a set-off on its claim. Compare the decision
of United States Supreme Court in New York Nat. Bank
v. Massey, I92 U. S. 138.
In re Hay3ward. 13o Fed. 720, the United States District
Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania) decides an inter-
Landlord's esting and practical point when it holds that a
Lien landlord, having a lien or charge for the rent due
him on the property of his tenant at the time of the latter's
bankruptcy, but the amount of which was unadjudicated, in
order to preserve his rights to priority must establish his
claim by proof under the Bankruptcy Act the same as other
creditors.
BILLS AND NOTES.
The United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania holds in Earle v. Enos, 13o Fed. 467, that
Accommoda. a parol agreement by a bank, made at the time
tion Note: of the delivery of an accommodation note and
Evidence its discount by the bank, that it would not look
to the maker for payment, but solely to the person for
whose accommodation the note was given, and that it will
apply thereon collaterals belonging to such person, cannot
be shown to defeat an action on the note, its effect being to
vary the written contract. Compare Gillespie v. Campbell,
5 L. R. A. 698, and note thereto.
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CARRIERS.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, passing upon th
general duties of a carrier of goods upon the arrival of the
Delivery: goods, holds in Burr v. Adants Exp. Co., 58
Notice of At. 6o9, that where the contract of carriage
Arrival contemplates delivery of the goods upon.the car-
rier's premises at the terminus of the route, and no time for
the arrival of the goods or for their delivery is stipulated
for, the duty of making delivery to the consignee involves
either the allowance to the consignee of a reasonable time
within which to make inquiries respecting their arrival or else
the duty on the part of the carrier of giving notice of arrival
to the consignee; and also involves, in either case, the allow-
ance to the consignee of a reasonable time and opportunity
after notice of arrival of the goods within which to take
them away. Compare Norway Plains Co. v. Boston and
Maine Railroad, i Gray, 263.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The local-option questions arising in connection with
liquor legislation constantly give rise to cases respecting the
Delegation of delegation of legislative power. A new decision
Legislative is found In re McDonnell's Liccnse, 58 Atl. 65,
Powers where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds
that the Act of April 28, 1889 (P. L. 68), repealing the Act
of April i I, 1866 (P. L. 658), relating to the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors in the limits of Potter County, and providing
that the repeal should not go into effect unless a majority
of the qualified voters of the county should vote in favor of
said repeal, was not unconstitutional as delegation of legis-
lative powers to the voters of such county. One judge dis-
sents.
CONTRACTS.
An excellent discussion of the law relating to the enforce-
ment of contracts requiring continuous acts occurs in the
Continuous decision of the United States Circuit Court of
Acts Appeals (Third Circuit) in the case of Westcrn
Union Tclcgraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 129 Fed. 849. It
is there held that if a contract is not revocable at the will of
either party, or otherwise limited as to its duration, by its
express terms, or by the inherent nature of the contract itself
with reference to its subject-matter or its parties, it is pre-
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sumably intended to be permanent and perpetual in the obli-
gation it imposes. The court further decides'that a court
of equity is not precluded from decreeing the specific #er-
formance of a contract because it is contintiusin its opera-
tion, where the principal, if not- the only, relief required is
injunctive, to preserve the status quo which has existed be-
tween the parties for nearly .fifty years, and to prevent the
threatened termination of the contract by the defendant.
For a note on the law herein involved see Berlinger Grama-
phone Co. v. Seaman, 49 C. C. A. xo3.
CORPORATIONS.
In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Louisville Gas Co., 81 S. W. 927,
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that the fact that
the charter of a gas company provided that it
Right to might issue bonds for $5ooooo, and execute a
Guarantee mortgage on its property to secure them; did not
Bonds so limit the corporation's power to contract in-
debtedness as to prevent it from guaranteeing the paymeni
of over $,oooooo worth of bonds sold by it after it had law-
fully acquired them in the conduct of the business for which
it was organized.
DEEDS.
The Supreme Court of Michigan decides in Harris v.
Roraback, ioo N. V. 392, that a building designed and
Restrction planned for two families, one to occupy the
as to Use of ground floor and one the second floor, each to
Lot ' have a separate entrance, violates the restriction
in a deed of lots that they shall not be occupied except for
" one dwelling-house to each lot." Compare the two cases
of Gillis v. BaileV. 21 N. H. i49, and Hutchinson v. Ulrich,
145 Ill. 336.
DIVORCE.
The vexed question of to what extent the court of one
state is bound to recognize the divorce decree of another
Attak s state seems still to give rise to difficulties in spite
Foreigt of the decisions by the SupremeOCourt of the
DecIe United States in relation to this matter.. Thus
in Davenport v. Davenport, 58 At]. 535, the. Court-f, Chan-
cery of New Jersey holds that a divorce decree granted in
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another state of the United States will not be recognized in
this state if it appears that in applying for such divorce the
applicant fraudulently misstated or suppressed facts within
his knowledge which would, if the truth were known or dis-
closed, have adversely affected the judgment rendered, or
if it appears that the applicant knew where the defendant
resided, and yet io actual notice of the pendency of such suit
was given to sich defendant. Compare Atherton v. Ather-
ton, I8i U: S. 155.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
In Sweet v. Montpelier Say. Bank and Trust Co., 77 Pac.
538, the Supreme Court of Kansas decides that where money
Conversion has been wrongfully converted to the use of a
of Funds corporation, and the assets of the corporation,
by its insolvency, have come into the hands of a receiver,
the following of the funds in the hands of the receiver as
a trust fund does not preclude the maintaining of an action
to recover against the parties by whose wrongful act the
funds were converted, the two remedies not being incon-
sistent. Compare Heidelbach v. National Park Bank, 87
Hun. 117.
EQUITY.
The Supreme Court of Alabama decides in Broun v.
Mayor, etc., of City of Birmingham, 37 Southern, 173, that
Jurisdiction: the fact that threatened criminal prosecutions
criminnl Pro- under an alleged void ordinance will inflict ir-
ceedings reparable damage on the person threatened does
not confer on courts of equity jurisdiction to enjoin such
prosecutions at his instance. And it is further held that the,
threat of repeated and numerous criminal prosecutions under:
an alleged void ordinance affords no ground for injunctive
relief, on the theory of preventing a multiplicity of suits.
EVIDENCE.
Dying declarations are statements of material facts con-
cerning the cause and circumstances of a homicide made by
Dying the victim under a solemn conviction of impend-
Declarations ing death. Being a substitute for. sworn testi-
mony, they must be such narrative statements as-woitld b
admissible had the dying person been sworn asi a witness
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The statement, "That's all right; Bill Harris is my friend,
and I don't want nothing done to him," is not admissible
as a dying declaration. Supreme Court of Louisiana in
State v. Harris, 36 S. 8io. Compare Adams v. People, 47
IIl. 380.
GARNISHMENT.
A married woman, being the owner of stock in a national
bank, transferred the same to her husband to enable him to
Property qualify as a director in the bank on the unider-
Transferred to standing that as soon as he was elected director
Debtor's Wife he should retransfer the stock. Under these
facts the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides in Citizens'
Nat. Bank v. Sturgis Nat. Bank, 81 S. W. 55o, that though
the arrangement resulted in an evasion of the federal statutes
respecting the qualification of national bank directors, the
husband held the stock in trust for his wife until retrans-
* ferred, and that after the retransfer, though without a con-
sideration, the stock was not subject to garnishment by a
creditor of the husband's.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
In Bingham v. Weller, 81 S. W. 843, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee decides that a deed from husband to wife, to
Crtesy. her sole Pnd separate use, discharged from all
Separate his control and liabilities, with full power in her
Estate to sell, convey, or mortgage, deprives him of
the right to the estate by curtesy. The court admits that
where such estate is created by a deed from a third person
the usual holding is that the right of curtesy in the husband
still exists. A different result, it is contended, should apply
where the husband himself creates the estate, since othef-
wise the wife will be deprived of much of the benefit of the
grant, and it is not to be presumed in favor of the grantor
that an interest which may be conveyed is reserved, in the
absence of express language. Compare the cases of Fraser
v. Hightower, 12 Heisk. 94, and Barnum v. LeA'faster, 75
S. W. 1045.
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INJUNCTION.
In Packard v. Thici College of Evangelical Lutheran
Church, 58 Atl. 670, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Corporation: decides that the Act of June 19, 1871 (P. L.
Who May i36o), giving courts power .to restrain by in-
Maintain Suit junction unlawful acts of corporations where the
private rights of individuals are injured or invaded, does not'
permit inquiry at the instance of a private suitor 'as to. the
validity of a charter or as to its forfeiture; but where an
act for the incorporation of a college provides that it shall
be permanently located as it shall thereafter be determined.
by the trustees, and the trustees have permanently located
the college at a particular place, persons who have contrib-
uted funds for its establishment in such place have a standing
to maintain a suit to prevent its removal. Compare the
former decision arising out of this controversy upon other
facts in 56 Atl. 869.
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURT.
The interesting questions arising with regard to the appli-
cation of state law in the federal courts to the adjustment
Dlsot,,tiou of corporate rights are continually giving rise
of to important decisions. In Jacobs v. Mexican
Corporation Sugar Co., i3o Fed. 589, the United States Cir-
cuit Court (District of New Jersey) holds that a proceeding
by a stockholder or creditor of a corporation for an injunc-
tion and the appointment of a receiver for the corporation
as an insolvent under the New Jersey Corporation Act (P. L.
1896, p. 298, Sec. 65), which authorizes such proceeding
in the Court of Chancery whenever a corporation shall be-
come insolvent or suspend its ordinary business for want of
funds, is one involving a money controversy, so as to that
extent to be within the jurisdiction of the federal court,
where diversity of citizenship exists and the requisite amount
is in dispute. It is further decided that a suit by a stock-
holder of an insolvent corporation for the dissolution of the
corporation and the winding up of its affairs is within the
jurisdiction of a federal court of equity where such remedy
is expressly given the stockholder by a state statute. Sei
the note to Republican Mountain Silver Mine v. Brown,
7 CC. A. 421.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.
In Radey v. McCurdy, 58 Atl. 558, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds that where a tenant secured a new. lease
Tro" in the nature of an extension of.the.old lease,
Fixtures, and the new lease contained no reservation of
the riglifto :remove trade fixtures attached to -the land by
the tenant,. hie may keep tlhe fixtures on'the-premises without
giving the landlord the right to restrain their removal at or
before the expiration of the second lease. It will be remem-
bered that miiany cases have, held the contrary. The position
taken by the Pennsylvania court is that '" the law does not
in strictness require of him that he shall remove them during
the term, but only before he surrenders possession and dur-
ing the time that he has a right to regard himself as occupy-
ing in the character of tenant" See Penton v. Robart, 2
East, 88.
In Lough v. John Davis & Co., 77 Pac. 732, the Supreme
Court of Washington decides that the agent of a non-resident
Agent o owner of a building, in complete charge thereof,
Landlord: and authorized to make repairs, was liable for
Authority injuries to the infant child of a tenant caused
by the agent's negligent failure to repair a rotten and unsafe
veranda railing. Questions arose in the case with regard
to the scope of authority of the agent, and it is decided that
where, in an action for injuries to the child of the tenant of
a building against the agent of the non-resident owner, it
was admitted that the agent had authority to rent the prop-
erty and collect the rents, evidence that certain repairs had
been made and paid for at the instance of such agent was
admissible, as tending to show its authority to repair the
defect in question. Compare Wilcox v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
24 Minn. 269.
LARCENY.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Cochran vi Fox Chase Bank, 58 AUt. 117, that where coupon
o B bonds payable to bearer had been stolen and
pledged to a bank in the ordinary-course of busi-
ness, without any circumstances putting the bank on inquiry,
the bank took a good title thereto as against the true owner.
The court refers to the change in attitude of the law with
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respect to bonds. See in regard to this case Gorgier v. Mie-
ville, 3 B. & C., 45, and County of Beaver v. Armstrong, 44
Pa. 63.
LIFE ESTATE.
A- will devising land to a devisee directed that she should
not sell or mortgage the same during life, but declared -that
Restraints she might rent it and use the rents, and provided
on that after her death the title should vest in her
AllenatloW children and their heirs. Under these facts the
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides in Sprinkle v. Leslie,
81 S. W. ioi8, that the devisee took only a life estate, with
remainder to her children, but that the restriction as to her
power to alienate her interest was void. Compare Simonton
v. Vhite, 93 Tex. 5o.
LOTTERIES.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas holds in McRea
v. State, 81 S. IV. 741, that a lottery is a "scheme for the
What distribution of prizes by lot or chance, espe-
Constitutes cially a gaming scheme in which one or more
tickets bearing particular numbers draw prizes and the rest
of the tickets are blank." It is therefore decided, applying
this definition, that a knife-rack operated by defendant, con-
sisting of an inclined table, with knives stuck therein; and so
arranged that rings could be thrown on them, which rings
defendant sold to customers who endeavored to ring the
knives on the table, they being entitled to any knives rung
or on which the rings caught, did not constitute a lottery.
.UNACY.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, holding that the insanity
of a client operates to terminate the relation of attorney and
Attorneys client, decides in Chase v. Chase, 71 N. E. 485,
that where defendant in a lunacy inquisition was
so insane at the time he employed certain attorneys to defend
him that he was wholly oblivious to the fact, and incapable
of knowing that his mental status was involved in the suit,
the agreement conferred no authority on stch attorneys td
appear for the defendant at the trial or to prosecute an appeal
from a decree finding defendant to be.an insane person..
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Missouri (Division No. 2) de-
cides in Perkinson v. Hoolan, 8I S. V. 407, that where a
Assessments: street improvement was constructed under an
Objections: unconstitutional law, the fact that owners of
Estoppel property assessed therefor stood by in silenceand
permitted..the work to be done without protest, did not pre-
elude them from thereafter contesting the validity of the tax
on that ground. Compare Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo. 26.
PARENT AND CHILD.
The situations in which the-custody of children will be
denied to parents and conferred upon more distant relatives
Custody of seems'not to be very clearly defined, and new.
Children decisions thereon are. welcome. In re Steele,
81 S. W. 1182, the Kansas City Court of Appeals (Mis-
souri) holds that a wife who was divorced for adultery and
married her paramour after his wife had obtained a divorce
was not, after her husband's death, entitled to the custody
of her infant daughter as against respectable relatives of the
husband who were financially able to care for the child. See
Krencl berg v. K-remelberg, 52 Md. 553.
PLEDGES.
The essential difference between a pledge and a mortgage,
which in some respects are similar, gives rise to some inter-
mortgazes: esting decisions. One of these occurs in the case
Foreclosure of Blood v. Shepard, 77 Pac. 565, where the
Supreme Court of Kansas decides that where choses in ac-
tion, the payment of wlhich is secured by a real estate mort--
gage, are pledged as collateral security for the payment of a
debt, and such mortgage is foreclosed and title and posses-
sion taken thereunder, such title is vested in him, and is sub-
stituted for the pledged choses in action, and is governed by
the law of pledges and not of mortgages. It is further held
that in such case the pledgor is not enititled to have te
pledgee's claim foreclosed as though it were a mortgage,
but the pledgee i s entitled to have his legal title quieted in
such land if the pledgor fails after a reasonable time to pay
the amount found due the pledgee.
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RECEIVERS.
The case of Bowman v. Hatcn, 77 Pac. 589, presents an
interesting discussion and decision in regard to the rights
Appointment: and liabilities of receivers. It is there held that
Validity: all order of court appointing a receiver to take
Collateral custody of property involved in litigation which
Attack was unwarranted and erroneous, but not abso-
lutely void, is not open to collateral attack; but that the
orders of a court, purporting to vest a receiver with the
authority and control of property and funds not involvid
in the litigation in which the receiver was appointed, are
absolutely void, and can be collaterally attacked at any time
by any one in any proceeding where their validity is in issue.
The court further decides that the receiver who takes such
property and funds under the void orders without the con-
sent and contrary to the wishes of the owner, and those who
procure the orders to be made and co-operate with him in
the wrongful seizure and appropriation, are all trespassers,
and are liable for the property and funds so wrongfully taken
with interest. Compare In re Dill, 32 Kans. 691.
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
In M Iiddlese.r Banking Co., 37 Southern, 139, the Supreme.
Court of Mississippi decides that a grantor who reserves out
Estate In of the operation of his deed a legal life estate
Grantor for himself cannot be counted as one of the
donees within whose life the ultimate fee must vest in order
to preserve the deed under the rule against perpeiuities.
STOCK QUOTATIONS.
The United States Circuit Court of. Appeals (Seventh Cir-
cuit) holds in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. 'La-
Property Kinsev Co.,. I3o Fed. 5o7, that even if it were
Therein: tne that a very large percentage of the contracts
illegalTrans- for the sale of commodities for future- delivery
actions made on an exchange were gambling transac-
tions, such fact does not deprive the board of trade con-
ducting the exchange of its property rights in the price quo-
tations based on its sales, which are the same for the lawful
as for the unlawful transactions. Compare note to Sullivan. -
Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 61 C. C. A. 2.
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SURETYSHIP.
In First Nat. Bank of Nashville v. National Surety Co.,
13o Fed. 4o, the United. States Circuit Court of Appeals
-o*, (Sixth Circuit) decides that when there are dif-
Different ferent bonds given by a bank official,. covering
Terms different periods. of time, with different sureties,
an unappropriated-payment made by the common principal
is not aiwa to 1bepplied by the court to the oldest obliga-
tion. Regaitwititist be had. t6 the responsibility of the, dif-
ferent sureties, as .limitidjy the period for which they re-
spectively contract, as will as to the injustice that would
ensue if collections reciived under one obligation are applied
to the discharge of a liability under a preceding or succeed-
ing term, with distinct sureties. Compare Gwynne v. Barnes,
7 Clark & F. Rep. H. L. Cas. 571.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire,. holding in Dol-
beer v. Suncook Water Works Co., 58 Ati. 5o4, that a natu-
Large or ral, fresh-water pond containing fifteen or more
reat Pond acres, though situated in the midst of and en-
tirely surrounded by the land of a private person, is a large
or great pond, the bed of which inside of high-water mark
is public property, decides, nevertheless, that though a large
or great pond so situated is public property, the owner of
the land has a reasonable private right of using -the water
for domestic, agricultural, and mechanical purposes, and
may build wharves and other structures into the pond for
his own use to an extent that will not unreasonably interfere
with the rights of the public in the pond, and as an incident
of the ownership of the land on which a dam may be built
to control the flow of water from the pond he has the right
to a reasonable use of the pond for a reservoir.
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